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RECENT CASES.
BANKRUPTcY-LEAsE-LEssEE'S ADJUDICATION DOES NOT TERmiNATE.-IN
RE CURTIs, 9 Am. B. R. 286; 33 SO. 125 (LA.).-On a rehearing, held, that
where a lessee, holding under an unexpired lease, is adjudicated a bankrupt,
at a time when he owes no rent, such adjudication does not terminate the
lease.
Whether an adjudication in bankruptcy terminates the relation of land-
lord and tenant is a much disputed question. On the former hearing of
the present case the court decided that it does, following the decisions of
the district courts of Kentucky and North Carolina. In re Jefferson, 93
Fed. 951, 2 Am. B. R. 2o6; Bray v. Cobb, ioo Fed. 270; In re Hays, Foster
and Ward Co., 117 Fed. 879, 12 Yale Law Journal 247. In this last case
Evans, J., reaffirms the position taken in In re Jefferson, supra, that when
the tenant is adjudged to be a bankrupt the relation of landlord and tenant
ipso facto comes to an end. This principle, however, seems hardly deducible
from the cases cited. In re Breck, Fed. Cas. -No. 1822; In re Webb, Fed.
Cas. No. 17315; Bailey v. Loeb, Fed. Cas. No. 739, I N. B. R. 271. The
decision in the present case, though holding as do the cases just cited, that
the claim for future rent, being contingent, is not provable against the
state of the bankrupt, finds nothing in the Bankrupt Act which would
terminate the lease. This decision is in line with the earlier, though not
with the later English cases, see ex parte Houghton, Fed. Cas. No. 6725,
and with the decisions of the District Court of Mass., In re Ells, 98 Fed. 967,
3 Am. B. R. 564; ex-parte Houghton, supra; Savory v. Stocking, 4 Cush. 607.
In Atkins v. Wilcox, lo5 Fed. 595, 53 L. R. A. 118, the U. S. Circuit Court
of Appeals reviewed these opposing views of the district courts, without
expressing an opinion as to which of them correctly interprets the law.
BANKRUPTCY-PREFERENCE-KNWLEDGE OF CREDITORS.-SHERMAN V.
LUCKHARDT, 9 Am. B. R. 312, 70 PAC. 702 (KAN.).-Held, that a prefer-
ential payment by a debtor to one of his creditors is not void, though made
with a fraudulent intent on the debtor's part, if it be accepted by the creditor
without knowledge of such intent and without knowledge that a preference
was intended. Doster, C. J., and Burch and Pollock JJ., dissenting.
Under section 6ob of the Bankruptcy Act, a preference is voidable,
"when the person receiving it shall have had reasonable cause to believe that
it was intended thereby to give a preference," while under section 67e, all
transfers, etc., made with intent on the part of the bankrupt to hinder or
defraud creditors are void as against such creditors. The present decision
limits the application of the latter section to transfers other than to creditors,
on the ground that the former section had fully covered transfers to cred-
itors. This seems to have been the construction of these sections in Pire
v. Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438, and McNair v. McIntyre, I13 Fed. 113. But
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in neither of these cases was the transfer, as to the preferential character of
which the creditor was ignorant, made with intent to defraud. The dis-
senting opinion in the present case holds that where there is any fraud
on the part of the debtor, section 67e should govern, whether the transfer
be to a creditor or not, on the ground that only thus can the purpose of the
act to protect creditors be preserved. The weight of authority seems to
support this view. In re Steininger Co., io7 Fed. 669; In re Jones, 9 Am.
B. R. 262; In re McLane, 3 Am. B. R. 245, and note.
BANKRUPTCY-PROPERTY EXEMPT UNDER SECTION 6 OF BANKRUPTCY ACT.
-PAGE V. EDMONDS, 9 AM. B. R. 277, U. S. Sup. CT., JAN., io3.-The Penn-
sylvania Insolvent Law (Pa. Laws 72) provides that "every insolvent shall
be entitled to retain all such articles as may by law be exempted from levy
and sale upon execution," and the Supreme Court of that State had decided
that a seat in a stock exchange is not property subject to levy and sale
under an execution. Held, that where such decisions are mere definitions
of property and do not rest upon any interpretation of a State exemption
law, such seat and its proceeds are not exempt under section 6 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
This decision of the Supreme Court is important in defining the scope
of section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act, which retains the exemptions prescribed
by the various State insolvency laws. It decides in effect that under this
section only such property is included as exempt, as shall be exempted
either expressly by such State insolvency laws or in the interpretation of
such laws. Where, as in the present case, the exemption is merely in-
cidental, as a result of a declaration of general law as to the character of
property, the conclusion is not binding upon the Federal court.
CARRIERS-EJECTION OF PASSENGER-DuTY TO PAY FARE TO PREVENT
WRONGFUL EJECTION.-PENNSYLVANIA Co. v. LENHART, 120 FED. 6.--The
holder of a mileage book, requiring presentation at the ticket office for a
mileage exchange ticket, presented his book to the agent. The agent was
not supplied with such tickets but promised to explain to the conductor.
The conductor refused to give the passenger an exchange ticket and ejected
him from the train. Held, that he was not required to pay his fare and
sue for its recovery.
Many authorities hold that the ticket presented by the passenger is
conclusive evidence of the extent of his rights, as between him and the
conductor, and when by its terms it does not entitle him to passage, although
the fault may be that of the railroad company, it is his duty to pay fare
and seek his remedy for the breach of contract. Hall v. Ry. Co., 15 Fed. 57;
Mosher v. St. Leonis, etc., Co., 17 Fed. 880; Ry. Co. v. Stocksdale, 83 Md.
245, Woods v. Ry. Co., 48 Mo. App. 125. Others hold that if the purchaser
of a ticket performs all the stipulations of the contract on his part, or offers
to do so, the company is bound to honor the ticket when duly presented,
notwithstanding any mistake or omission by its agents. Trice v. Ry. Co.,
4-, W. Va. -- 271 ; Head v. Georgia, etc., Co., 79 Ga. 358; Ry. Co. v. Painson,
70 Fed. r85; Ry. Co. v. Winter, 143 U. S. 6o. The modern tendency is
toward the latter view.
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CARRIERS-INJURY TO PASSENGER-LEAVING MOVING TRAIN-CoNTRMU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE.-C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. WINFREY, 93 N. W. 526 (NEB.).-
While plaintiff was leaving the car, and before she reached the door, the
train began to move. She continued the act of alighting and was injured.
Held, that such action did not necessarily bar a recovery, but the question
of contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury.
While this opinion is supported by the previous decisions of the same
court, the weight of authority seems to be that a passenger who attempts to
step from a car in motion cannot recover, even though he had reached his
destination and the train had not stopped for a reasonable length of time to
allow him to alight. Jewell v. Ry. Co., 54 Wis. 61o; Burrows v. Erie Ry.
Co., 63 N. Y. 556; Hoehn v. Ry. Co., 152 Ill. 223. The right of recovery is
denied more strictly in case of steam railways than of street railroads.
12 Yale Law Journal 177. Generally where recovery has been allowed, it
was difficult for the passenger to know whether the train were moving;
Cousins v. Ry. Co., 96 Mich. 386; or where it was dark. Brooks v. B. & M.
Ry. Co., 135 Mass. 21.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCEss-RESTRICTION ON HEIGHT OF BUILD-
ING--ComPENSATION.-WILLIAMS V. PARKER, ATT'Y-GEN., 23 Sup. CT. REP.
44o-A writ of error to review judgment of Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, which affirmed the constitutionality of a statute. enacding
that all buildings thereafter erected on Copley Square. in the itv of 13.ton,
should not exceed go feet in height. The owners of property taken under
this statute were further protected by a clause making the city of Boston
liable in damages. Defendants contended that this clause violated Ait. I,
clause 2. I4th Amendment to U. S. Constitution. Held, that as the liability
of the municipality was such as could be imposed by the State, the enforce-
ment of statute was not a taking of property without due process of law.
By the above decision, the Copley Square case, which has attracted
considerable attention in the past few years, has reached its final adjudication.
The right of the legislature to secure the permanent beauty uf public parks
and squares by the exercise of eminent domain-the basis of the prior
Massachusetts decisions in the case-was not commented upon by the
Supreme Court and the case may be taken as a well considered precedent in
future actions. Att'y-Gcn. v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476; Williams v. Parker,
178 Mass. 330. The court in accordance with its expressed rule did not
examine into the constitutionality of the statute as governed by the con-
stitution of Massachusetts. Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198. While the
city, not being a party to the suit, might not be technically estopped from
denying its liability, the court was of opinion that the legislature had
authority to cast the duty of compensation, as a public burden, upon it.
INJUNCTIoN--RGHT TO RELIEF-UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH PER-
FORMANCE OF CONTRACT.-CHESAPEAKE & 0. COAL AGENCY Co. v. FIRE CREEK
COAL AND COKE Co. ET AL, 119 FED. 942.-The bill of plaintiff corporation
alleged that it had contracts with defendant coal companies to take the
product of their mines and sell the same; that by the terms of such contracts
defendants were not liable for damages for failure to furnish coal, where
such failure was caused by strikes; that defendant companies were prevented
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from furnishing coal, by the wrongful acts of individual defendants, who
were conducting a strike, and by intimidation and threats prevented others
from working in the mines. Held, that plaintiff's contract rights entitle it
to maintain the suit in its own right, and that it has stated a cause of action
for an injunction against the individual defendants to prevent their further
interference with the performance of the contracts by the coal companies.
It is well settled that an injunction will issue to prevent persons from
attempting by intimidation or other unlawful means to force employees into
a strike. Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, 5i Fed. 26o; Shoe Co. v. Saxey,
131 Mo. 212; Reynolds v. Everett, 144 N. Y. i89; China Co. v. Brown, 164
Pa. 449. It has been decided in England that an action will lie by one party
to a contract against a third party, who induces the other party to the
contract to break it. Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BI. 216; Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B.
D. 346; but in the absence of contract there is no right to relief. Allen v.
Flood, 1898 A. C. I. The tendency in this country, however, is to give a
remedy even in the absence of a contract. Walker v. Cronin, 1o7 Mass. 555;"
Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82. In this case the court extends the above
doctrine, on the ground that there is no distinction between wrongfully and
maliciously inducing one to break a contract and unlawfully and maliciously
rendering a contract impossible of performance. Whether this decision will
be sustained in the higher court may be doubtful.
INSURANCE-BENEFIT-AMENDMENT OF RuLEs-RASONABLENESs--NoTIcE
TO MEMBERS.-TEno v. ROYAL ARCANUM, 93 N. W. 513 (MiNx.).-The
insured agreed by his application to be bound by the rules then existing
and those thereafter enacted. Later he took employment as a freight brake-
man, an occupation which was afterwards prohibited by an amendment
declaring a forfeiture in case a member should engage in that occupation.
He received no notice of the new by-law, and a year later was killed.
Held, that the amendment was unreasonable and void as to the insured.
This imposes an important restriction on the right of benefit associations
to amend provisions in the contracts with their members. Provisions for
forfeiture clearly and unequivocally expressed and made a part of the con-
tract should be as binding as any other provision, and, if lawful, cannot be
avoided becLause harsh or burdensome. Yoe *V. Benefit ,lss'n, 63 Ald. 86;
3 .An. & Eng. Enc. Lawu io88. A sulbsequent legal ahiendment is binding upon
the ittaured where he has bound himself irrevocably by the stipulations in his
application. Knights of Pythias v. Lea Malta, 95 Tenn. 157; Hobbs v. Benefit
Ass'n, 82 Iowa io7. Whe're the right to amend is expressly reserved, the mem-
ber is bound to take notice of the effect of that reserved power. Knights ot
I'ythias v. Knight, 117 Ind. 489. The rules should be even more rigidly applied
than in ordinary life policies. Madeira v. Benefit Society. 16 Fed. 749.
MASTER AND SERVANT-FELLOW SERVANT RuLE-ABRoGATION BY CANAD-
IAN STATUTE-RECOGNITION OF STATUTE.-RICK V. SAGINAW BAY TOWING
Co., 93 N. W. 63.2 (Micn.).-A Canadian statute makes the employer liable
for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow servant who is exercising
any superintendence over the one injured. In an action for such an injury
occurring in Canada, held, that the statute will be recognized, though con-
ferring a right on plaintiff not recognized by Michigan htw.
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There is a distinction between a right of action for an injury in another
State as given by statute, and one given by common law. The latter is
transitory and where the variance is not fundamental will be enforced.
Walsh v. Ry. Co., i6o Mass. 57I. Where the right of action is given by
statute its operation in another State can be enforced only by comity. Gen-
erally this will be done if the statutes in the two Staces are substantially
similar. Debervoise v. Railroad Co., 98 N. Y. 377. This is also the rule
in the United States courts. Dennick v. Ry. Co., lO3 U. S. ii. The fact
that the statute is that of a foreign country is immaterial. Fisher, Brown
& Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91. The right of recovery, however, was denied
in Davis v. Ry. Co., 143 Mass. 3Ol, the court declining to follow the rule
in Dennick v. Ry. Co., supra, and adhering to its own former decisions. A
still stronger sentiment against such right of recovery has been shown in
several other States. Ash v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 72 Md. 144; Anderson v.
Ry. Co., 37 Wis. 321; Dale v. Ry. Co., 57 Kan. 6oi.
M ASTER AND SERVAN-r-INJURk TO EMPLOYE-MASTER'S LABUTY.-WV.
R. TRI' Co. v. LINDSAY, 43 S. E. 349 (VA.).---leld, that the ma: r ;S am
liabk f ,,r ;-isafe (onditic.,. -drg while m:, hiiiery is in process of erection.
The oi';nion :ntimates that had the same accident occtrred after the
machinery had been put in operation, the defendant company would have
been held liable distinguishing accidenfs during construction or while repairs
are being made from those during operation. Although a master is bound
to furnish safe. machinery for the use of the servant. Fuider v. Jewett go
N. Y 46, liability for an injury will not attach with the same cera inty
while. the. machinery is being repaired Murphy v. Raitruad Co., 89 N, Y.
146. 1 Darthn. ,,th Spiw.ning Co. .4chord. -4 G;.. 16, it was held -that
the risk of concealed dangers incidcnt to the worn of making repairs is upon
the workman.
NuIsANc-BExR GARDE -I.Nj-OCT1O.-T1o.; ET AL. v. LEwis, 66 N. E.
490 (IND.).-A, under a licens, tc conduct a saloon, established an extca-iv-
beer garden in a thickly settled residence portion of the city of Indianajpelis.
Large and noisy crowds gathered there; and th% placc was conducted in
such a disorderly way that a bad ieputation was given to the neighborhood
and a prejudice created against it as a residence district. Held, that the
maintenance of such a resort is a nuisance, and will be enjoircd at the
suit of neighboring property owners whose property is depreciated in value
thereby.
This decision is based on Haggart v. Stehlin, 137 Ind. 43, where it was
held that a saloon constitutes an actionable nuisance to neighboring property
owners whose property is depreciated in value by reason of its proximity,
when it is established in a residence neighborhood which has been previously
free from such business, and in which the people are largely opposed to
saloons; and the fact that the saloon-keeper has a license is no defense
against civil liability. Following which, in Kissel v. Lewis, x56 Ind. 233,
an injunction was granted to restrain the maintenance of a disorderly beer
garden in a residence district. The doctrine of Haggart v. Stehlin, supra,
that a licensed saloon may constitute an actionable nuisance is characterized
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as "a new departure," and "of extraordinary importance," in note in 22
L. R. A. 577. It appears not to have been considered in any other court.
NUISANCES-STORING POWDER-LIABILITY FOR EXPLOSION.-KLEEBAUER Er
UX. V. WESTERN FUSE & EXPLOSIVES CO., 71 PAC. 617 (CAI,.)-A manufac-
turing company kept in store, powder necessary for its business, and it was
exploded by the willful act of another. Held, that the keeping of the powder
was not necessarily a nuisance,, so as to render the company liable in any
case to third parties injured by the explosion.
The keeping of explosives near a city has been held a nuisance per se.
Cheatham v. Shearon, I Swan 213; Coal Co. v. Glass, 34 Ill. App. 364. The
contrary has been held in People v. Sands, I Johns. 78, and with regard to a
sparsely settled spot in Dumesntl v. Dupont, I8 B. Mon. 80o. Whether it
is a nuisance per se has been held to be a question of fact. Heeg v. Licht,
8o N. Y. 579; Lounsbury v. Foss, 8o Hun 296. In Pennsylvania a magazine
may be a nuisance in a place not thickly settled if it is so situated as to be
liable to injure even a few persons. Appeal of Wier, 74 Pa. 230; and in
South Carolina if an explosion might injure the plaintiff and him alone.
Emory v. Powder Co., 22 S. C. 476. In Alabama, to constitute a nuisance,
a magazine, wherever situated, must be negligently maintained. Kinney v.
Koopinan, ii6 Ala. 310.
PARTNERSHIP NAME-USE BY SURVIVING PARTNER-GOOD WILL-SLATER
v. SLATER, go N. Y. SurP. 303.-Held, that no right to use the firm name,
except for the purpose of advertising as its successor, passes to the purchaser
of the good-will of a partnership dissolved by death; and that the right to
continue the business in the firm name does not remain in the surviving
partner.
When the firm name is used as a trade-mark simply or the purchaser
continues the business as a successor, there is no conflict as to the purchaser's
right; in each case the firm name is an asset. Levy v. Walker, io Ch. Div.
436; Honie v. Chaney, 143 Mass. 592; Caswell v. Hazard, 121 N. Y. 484;
Lindl., Partn. 447. But the English courts seem inclined to consider the con-
tinued use of a firm name a part of the good will when there is no danger of
loss to the original partners; Levy v. Walker, io Ch. Div. 436; Webster v.
Webster, 3 Swanst. 49o; Robertson v,. Quiddington, 28 Beav. 536; Lindl., Partn.
446; and have even gone so far as to hold that thie right to do business in
the firm name passed to the surviving partner as a property right. Lewis
v. Langdon, 7 Simons 421. The decisions on the question in this country
are few; but see Penn ?,. Bolles, 7 Abb. Pr. 2o2, where the right did not go
to surviving partner; and Blake v. Barnes, 26 Abb. N. C. 2o8, and Mason
v. Dawson, 15 Misc. (N. Y.) 595, where it did.
PERCOLATING WArATERS-DIVERSION.-STILLWATER WATER Co. v. FARMER,
93 N. W. 9o7 (MINN.).-Defendant diverted percolating waters from plain-
tiff's spring, and conducted them to the city sewer. Held, that a landowner
may be restrained from thus wantonly wasting percolating waters which
would otherwise be appropriated by the adjoining owner for a useful purpose.
A landowner may appropriate all the percolating waters in his soil
providing it is done for a useful purpose. But the absolute right to use
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his own property is denied him, on the ground of the maxim, sic utere tuo
ut alienuin non laedas. But generally this maxim is held to be applicable
only to such injuries as the law will redress. Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb.
(N. Y.) 23o. The question as to the effect of the motive prompting the
diversion of underground waters has seldom been before the courts. Some
authorities consider the motive an important, though not a controlling element.
Walker v. Cronin, io7 Mass. 555; Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. St. 514.
Contra, Bradford v. Pickles, L. R. (1895) A. C. 587; Phelps v. Nowlen, 72
N. Y. 39. The tendency of the decisions is to consider the reasonableness
of the use to which one's property is put. 12 Yale Law Journal 253.
PUBLIC POLICY-CONTRACT TO PROCURE LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION.-
VFAZEY v. ALLEN ET AL., 66 N. E. IO3 (N. Y.).-A contracted with B to
procure a congressional investigation into the affairs of the so-called Whiskey
Trust for the purpose of depreciating the market value of its securities, upon
B's agreement to divide with A any profits obtained by speculating in such
securities. Held, void as against public policy.
Contracts for the use of personal influence to procure legislative action,
where the one using such influence is himself pecuniarily interested in the
result, are against public policy because of the tendency of such a person to
further his own ends by means which are immoral, corrupt and destructive
of the public welfare. Mills %'. Mills, 40 F. Y. 546. Contracts for "lobby
services" are void. Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441: Chippewa Vallcy Ry. v.
Chicago, etc., Ry., 75 Wis. 224. The fact that the proposed act)-;n is un-
doubtedly for the public benefit is immaterial. "The law looks to till
general tendency of such agreements and closes the door to temptation b:-
refusing them recognition. Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 54. But the right
to hire a proper party to draft a bill or claim and openly and fairly to
explain it to the legislature, is unquestioned. Chesebrough v. Conover,
14o N. Y. 382.
PUBLICATION-LTERARY PROPERTY-COLLECTING INFORMATION-DISTRIBU-
TION-F. W. DODGE CO. V. CONSTRUCTION INFORMATION Co., 66 N. E. 204
(MAss.).-Where a company is engaged in collecting information as to
public improvements as soon as possible after they are contemplated, and in
distributing such information in printed, written, or oral form to its cus-
tomers to enable them to take steps to obtain contracts, held, that the com-
pany has a property right in such information; and that such distribution is
not such a publication as dedicates the information to the public and deprives
the company of its right of control.
It has been held that where one has been at trouble and expense to
obtain and compile information for a special use, he has a property right
therein. Exchange Tel. Co. v. Central News Co., [1897] 2 Ch. 48. but to
what extent and in what manner the compiler may distribute the information
without losing his right of control, has not been definitely decided. It has
been held, on the one hand, that a property right in stock quotations and in
news items is not lost by their distribution by telegraph among a limited
number of persons. Chicago v. Christie Co., 116 Fed. 944; Nat. Tel. News
Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., ig Fed. 297. On the other hand, the
distribution in book form among subscribers of information in regard to
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the business and commercial standing of parties engaged in a certain trade,
has been held a publication. Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 Fed. 703; Jewelcrs Mer-
cantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Pub. Co., 155 N. Y. 241. The difference
in the form in which the information is sent out seems to be the ground of
distinction in the decisions.
TAxATIoN-ExEMPTIONS-EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION.-COLoRADO SEMI-
NARY v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF ARAPAHOE CoUNTY ET AL., 71 PAC. 410
(CoLo.).-The charter of a seminary provided that property held by 
its
trustees and "necessary for carrying out the design ot the seminary in the
best manner," should be free from taxation "while used exclusively for such
purpose." Held, that property of the seminary merely income-bearing and
not used in the school itself was exempt.
Ordinarily. unless the statutes explicitly declare the contrary, exemption
will be confined to property used exclusively for the legitimate purposes of
the institution. Cincinnati College v. State, ig Ohio i1O; State v. Ross, 24
N. J. L. 497: Wyman v. St. Lot,", 17 Mo. 335- See Northwestern University
v. People, 99 U. S. 309. Use and not ownership is the test. Washburii
College v. Shawnee County. 8 Kan. 344; Phillips Academy v. Exeter, 58
N. H. 3o6. But this is not true in Vermont. Villard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202.
Farms, the products of which are used for the support of the school have
been held not exempt. St. Edward's College v. Morris, 82 Tex. I; Thiel
College v. Mercer County, ioi Pa. St. 530; College I'. Crowl, io Kan. 442.
Contra. Academy v. lVilbraham, 99 Mass. 599; State v. University, 87 Tenn.
233. If property is used for purposes other than the legitimate purposes of
the institution, the fact that the proceeds of such use are devoted to carrying
out the objects of the institution is immaterial. Cincinnati College i. State.
supra; Vagners Free Inst., etc., Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 555. See also County
Comm. v. Colo. Sen.. 12 Colo. 497, expressly overruled by the present
decision. Where the charter of a school provided that it might hold real
estate, which should be free from taxation while used for the promotion of
science, property was held exempt, the income only of which was used by
the school. New Haven 7. Sheffield Scientific School, 59 Conn. 163.
TELEGRAPHS-NELI(;ENCR-DIScLOSURE OF CALLS-TAPPING OF WIRE-
WESTERN UNION "EL. Co. v. UVALDE NAT. BANK, 72 S. W. 232 (T x.).-An
operator of appellant telegraph company disclosed the "call" of a certain
town to a stranger, who tapped the main wire and sent messages through
said town to the appellee. whereby it was induced to cash a worthless draft.
Held, that such disclosure by the operator was negligence and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss, and rendered the telegraph
company liable for the amount of the draft.
Though telegraph compa:lies may not he insurers, yet they are held
to a very high degree of care and caution to prevent their being made
instruments of fraud. The nature of their business requires this. Ehnwood
'. It'. C. Tel. CO., 45 N. Y. 549. Such a company is liable for loss by fraud,
rendered ;;osible by the negligence of its agent, provided such negligence
was the proximate cause of the loss. Bank of Col. 7'. H'. U. Tel. Co.,
52 Cal. 280: Lowery v'. IV. '. Tel. Co.. 6o N. Y. io8. The court indicates
that this is a case of first impression in applying the rules and principles
governing telegrams sent in the usual manner to those only apparently sent in
that manner.
